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Abstract— Type unions, pointer variables and function 
pointers are a long standing source of subtle security bugs in C 
program code. Their use can lead to hard-to-diagnose crashes 
or exploitable vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to attain 
privileged access over classified data. This paper describes an 
automatable framework for detecting such weaknesses in C 
programs statically, where possible, and for generating 
assertions that will detect them dynamically, in other cases. 
Exclusively based on analysis of the source code, it identifies 
required assertions using a type inference system supported by 
a custom made symbol table. In our preliminary findings, our 
type system was able to infer the correct type of unions in 
different scopes, without manual code annotations or 
rewriting.  Whenever an evaluation is not possible or is 
difficult to resolve, appropriate runtime assertions are formed 
and inserted into the source code. The approach is 
demonstrated via a prototype C analysis tool. 
Keywords- program analysis, C, polymorphic types, runtime 
assertions 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many non trivial projects written in C use type unions to 
allow efficient storing of different types of data in the same 
memory location.  With pointer variables, a programmer can 
flexibly access any memory location in the address space of 
a program.  Similarly, function pointers allow different 
functions to be called with a pointer.  These constructs 
provide C programmers with a rudimentary form of 
polymorphism.  
However, in a weakly typed language such as C, the 
compiler does not check on type compatibility of 
polymorphic variables such as unions and pointer variables.  
It is left to the responsibility of the programmer to ensure 
data type compatibility in operations involving polymorphic 
variables.  The result is a weak type system and consequently 
a great deal of ―flexibility‖ in introducing subtle bugs in 
programs [1].  Even programs such as the Linux kernel, 
written and extensively reviewed by experts, cannot escape 
such subtle errors.  For example, Figure 3 shows a recent 
vulnerability found in the 2.6.31 release of the Linux kernel 
involving a union type.  This code can be found at 
fs/hfs/catalog.c and its purpose is to mount an HFS 
file system. 
On line 27 of function hfs_fill_super() in 
Figure 3(a) a call to the hfs_bnode_read() function 
will lead to the simple memory copy operation located in file 
fs/hfs/bnode.c on line 8 in Figure 3(b).  There are no 
type checks on the buffer buf and node, which is a 
member of the user controlled structure hfs_find_data, 
as shown in Figure 1.   
Consequently, a user could create an HFS image that 
would return an HFS entry with len greater than the size of 
the statically, stack-allocated buf variable which is a union 
defined in Figure 2.  Because of this missing check, a buffer 
overflow can occur during the memcpy() operation that 
could overwrite memory space beyond the bounds of buffer 
buf in hfs_bnode_read(). 
A patch manually inserted into the code has been 
developed in this case.  However, similar kinds of errors may 
exist in other parts of the kernel, as unions are widely used.  
Almost 50% of recent CERT security advisories resulted 
from buffer overflow attacks made possible by code 
weaknesses of this kind [2].  Hence, there is a demand for 
tools able to check for potential type and value 
inconsistencies in security critical programs, in an automatic 
and sound way. 
Runtime checks help not only during testing, but can also 
appear in the release version of a program.  About 250,000 
lines of code of Microsoft Office are assertions, representing 
1% of the source code [3]. Chalin surveyed a number of 
software projects to determine the density of assertion 
statements in source code and reported an average assertion 
density of 3.27% in proprietary projects, 5.10% in open 
source projects, and 6.42% in Eiffel projects [4].  Therefore, 
reliance on runtime assertions to detect faults in large 
software is a common practice. 
1   struct hfs_find_data { 
2        btree_key *key; 
3        btree_key *search_key; 
4        struct hfs_btree *tree; 
5        struct hfs_bnode *bnode; 
6        int record; 
7        int keyoffset, keylength; 
8        int entryoffset, entrylength; 
9   }; 





1   /* A catalog tree record */ 
2   typedef union hfs_cat_rec { 
3 s8 type; /* The type of entry */ 
4        struct hfs_cat_file file; 
5        struct hfs_cat_dir dir; 
6 struct hfs_cat_thread thread; 
7   } hfs_cat_rec;  
 
Figure 2. Code from Linux Kernel: Type union hfs_cat_rec 
 
 
However, assertions are not yet fully utilized for security 
analysis.  One reason is that most software developers have 
little idea of what information should be specified in an 
assertion [5].  Furthermore, they will have to manually read 
through the source code, identify locations that need an 
assertion, construct the assertion and finally insert them in 
the source code.  Previous work advocated automatic 
detection of faults using assertions [5],[6],[7], but not 
automatic identification, construction and insertion of these 
assertions.  Although there is work on automatic generation 
of assertions, these assertions are produced from formal 
specifications of the program (e.g., written in JML), not 
solely from the source code [8].  
In this paper, we present an approach for automatic 
generation of type assertions at locations of potential bugs 
or vulnerabilities in C programs involving union and pointer 
variables.  Unlike previous work, we do not aim at defining a 
new, safer programming language; our goal is to automate 
the analysis and instrumentation of existing programs that 
may use any programming construct allowed by a gcc C 
compiler.  
Our main contribution is a framework for automatically 
generating assertions at appropriate locations of a source 
program to detect and prevent exploitable vulnerabilities 
associated with unions, pointer variables and function 
pointers.  Exclusively from the source code, we identify 
required assertions, and gather information needed to form 
the assertions using our own type inference system supported 
by a custom made symbol table. These assertions are then 
instrumented into the source program. 
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH 
Figure 4 depicts our complete chain of processes for 
automatic generation of assertions.  Using a type inference 
system and symbolic execution, our prototype parses plain 
C source as input.  During evaluation of type correctness, 
each program statement is classified into one of three 
categories: (i) Proven correct; (ii) Proven incorrect; and 
(iii) Undecidable. Undecidable cases require information 
which is either not available at compile time or is too 
difficult to evaluate statically.   
We only describe how we generate assertions for a 
program containing unions, but the principle for pointer 
variables and function pointers is the same.  The basis of our 
approach is to evaluate each program statement against a set 
of typing and symbolic execution rules.  In canonical form 
each rule is of the form α ^ β ^ γ ^ … If one of the rule‘s 
terms is evaluated as Undecidable, we generate an assertion 
 1  /* hfs_read_super() 
 2  *  
 3  * This is the function that is responsible for mounting an 
 4  * HFS filesystem.  It performs all the tasks necessary to 
 5  * get enough data from the disk to read the root inode.   
 6  * This includes parsing the mount options, dealing with 
 7  * Macintosh partitions, reading the superblock and the 
 8  * allocation bitmap blocks, calling hfs_btree_init() to get 
 9  * the necessary data about the extents and catalog B-trees 
 10 * and, finally, reading the root inode into memory. 
 11 */ 
 12 static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb,  
   void *data, int silent) 
 13 { 
 14   struct hfs_sb_info *sbi; 
 15   struct hfs_find_data fd; 
 16   hfs_cat_rec rec; 
 17   struct inode *root_inode; 
 18   int res; 
 19 
 20   sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hfs_sb_info),GFP_KERNEL); 
 21   ... 
 22         
 23   /* try to get the root inode */ 
 24   hfs_find_init(HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree, &fd); 
 25   res = hfs_cat_find_brec(sb, HFS_ROOT_CNID, &fd); 
 26   if (!res) 
 27      hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, 
                 fd.entrylength); 
 28   ... 
 29   bail: 
 30   hfs_mdb_put(sb); 
 31   return res; 
 32 } 
(a) 
 
1 void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf,  
        int off, int len) 
 2  { 
 3    struct page *page; 
 4 
 5    off += node->page_offset; 
 6    page = node->page[0]; 
 7 
 8    memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len); 
 9    kunmap(page); 
 10 } 
(b)  
 
Figure 3. A type union bug in the Linux Kernel: (a) Function 














1 #include <stdio.h> 
2 
3 typedef union u { 
4  int a; 
5  float b; 
6 } uni_u; 
7 
8 int something(uni_u m) { 
9  float f; 
10  int k; 
11  k = m.a; 
12  f = m.b; 
13  return k; 
14 } 
15 
16 int main(void) { 
17  uni_u n; 
18  n.a =4; 
19  if (something(n)) 
20   printf("+ve\n"); 
21  else 
22   printf("-ve\n"); 
23  return 0; 
24 } 
 
Figure 5. A program illustrating the unsafe use of union 
types 
 
Figure 4. An overview of the instrumentation process 
and insert it into the code to evaluate it precisely at runtime; 
in other words, if it cannot be proven statically that the rule 
is guaranteed to hold, we seek to prove dynamically that it 
holds in each particular execution of the program. 
We demonstrate the instrumentation process with a 
simple example of the C program shown in Figure 5.  
Although the program compiles using the gcc compiler 
without errors, it actually contains a logical error at line 12.  
The correctness of member selection on line 11 depends on 
what is supplied to the union parameter m.  But, m is 
unknown at compile time.  We determine this by doing two 
things.  Firstly, we insert all variables found in the function 
parameter and all local variables into a symbol table.  For a 
union such as m, we initialize its type with a symbolic type, 
as shown in Figure 6(a).  Secondly, each symbolic evaluation 
of a union is preceded by a lookup to the symbol table.  In 
this case, the symbolic type @m is returned when union m is 
evaluated on line 12.  As it involves a symbolic type, this 
evaluation is an undecidable case (i.e., not enough 
information is available statically). 
To make the symbolic evaluation of union m type correct, 
we need to ensure the supplied union m has a member 
selection a of type int at runtime.  To achieve this, we 
need to generate an assertion before k=m.a;, as shown in 
Figure 7. Note that gcc allows statements before variable 
declarations in a body of a function. Due to this assertion, the 
table will be updated accordingly—the symbolic type of m 
will now be associated with field int a, as shown in 
Figure 6(b).  Furthermore, due to the same assertion, a 
previously undecidable case at line 17 in Figure 7 will 
become a decidable case, by using the information available 
in the table.  Symbolic evaluation of the union on line 17 will 
trigger a lookup on m, and due to conflicting types between f 
and m, the type evaluation fails, and the statement is 
determined to be incorrectly typed statically, even though the 
gcc compiler fails to detect this.  
Based on this analysis our tool generates a ―diff‖ file for 
patching the unsafe code with runtime assertions.  The 
type_is(m,a) procedure in Figure 7 is a function to 
check whether the current type of union m is a‘s type.  The 
table is updated by first usage or by first definition of the 
union.  A similar approach is used for maintaining 
information about and evaluating the current types of pointer 
variables and function pointers. 
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Our prototype evaluator is implemented as an 
independent program using the sparse 0.4.1 library [9].  The 
sparse library provides functionality to parse a C source file 
and produce an abstract syntax tree (AST) for further 
processing.  We traverse the AST and build our own shadow 
symbol table for tracking and updating polymorphic 
variables in the source file.  The following sections describe 
how we construct the symbol table, perform a static analysis 
and finally show the algorithms that we use to generate the 
assertions. 
A. Symbol Table Maintenance 
While traversing the AST, if a new variable symbol with 
a polymorphic type is found, an entry is created in the 
symbol table as demonstrated in Figure 6(a) for the program 
in Figure 5. If a pointer variable declaration is made at line 9 
for the program in Figure 5, such as void *s;, an entry <s, 
@s> will be added to the symbol table. In general, if the 
symbol is a union, a pointer variable or function pointer, we 
add this symbol with a symbolic type, otherwise we add the 
symbol with its concrete type. 
It becomes more difficult when a variable with 
polymorphic type is embedded inside a compound structure.  
Without knowing that a structure contains a polymorphic 
variable, appropriate entries will not be created in the symbol 
table.  For example, when a lookup is made upon a member 
selection of a union inside a structure variable, the symbol 
table will have no information about it.  Therefore, it will 
treat the entry as non-existent, resulting in inaccurate 
evaluation.   
 
1 #include <stdio.h> 
2 #include "libassert.h" 
3  
4 typedef union u { 
5  int a; 
6  float b; 
7 } uni_u; 
8  




13  float f; 
14  int k; 
15 assert(type_is("m", "a", "int")); 
16  k = m.a; 
17  f = m.b; 
18 close_st(); 
19  return k; 
20 } 
21  
22 int main(void) { 
23 open_st("main"); 
24 relate(); 
25  uni_u n; 
26 add_polyvar("n"); 
27  n.a =4; 
28 update_sym("n", "a", "int"); 
29 inform_param_relation("@n","m"); 
30  if (something(n)) 
31   printf("+ve\n"); 
32  else 
33   printf("-ve\n"); 
34 close_st(); 
35  return 0; 
36 } 
 
Figure 7. Patching the source with the “diff” file will 
instrument the original source with runtime assertions 
Identifier Type Member Id 
f float  
k  int  
m @m  
(a) 
Identifier Type Member Id 
f float  
k int  
m @m  
    @m int a 
(b) 
Figure 6. The state of the symbol table (a) before; and 
(b) after line 11 in Figure 5 is evaluated 
 
Our strategy, therefore, is to flatten all compound data 
within a particular scope.  By doing this, we have separate 
memory locations for all members of a compound variable.  
As a result, it is easier to track the current state of a member 
selection/type of a particular polymorphic variable.  For 
example, analyzing the function something_else(), in 
the program in Figure 8 will result in the symbol table shown 
in Figure 9.  This kind of declaration is fairly common in the 
gtk framework, an object oriented framework in plain C that 
implements inheritance and polymorphism features.  
We flatten each compound variable using the following 
method: 1) As we parse each member of a compound 
variable, we create a unique entry into the global symbol 
table by concatenation of field names of the current member 
with its parent‘s field name; 2) If the member is a union or 
pointer variable, we assign a symbolic type (resembling the 
unique id to maintain uniqueness of the symbolic type, see 
Figure 9), else we assign it its concrete type.  
B. Static Analysis (Type Checking) 
Once the symbol table has been initialised, all statements 
and expressions can be analysed, including those involving 
unions and pointer variables.  Type compatibility checking is 
performed for every assignment, function argument-
parameter and function return.  As stated in Section 2, 
wherever possible we analyse type compatibility statically.  
For example, while the assignment on line 21 of Figure 8 
will be type checked as correct, the assignment on line 22 
will show a type incompatibility (storing a floating point 
number into an integer‘s memory space).  By contrast, as at 
least one side of the assignment involves a symbolic type, 
the type compatibility of the statement on line 23 is 
undecidable.  Due to this, an assertion needs to be inserted 
before it, such as assert(type_is(t.s.d.b, 
u.s.d.b)) (i.e., @t.s.d.b == @u.s.d.b).  We give the 
assertion generation algorithm in the next section. 
C. Assertion Generation 
Algorithm 1 is used for static type checking as well as for 
generating type assertions.  Respectively, T and S can be 
target and source symbols of an assignment, a function‘s 
argument-parameter or a function‘s return types.  We can see 
from the algorithm that if the target or source is a 
polymorphic variable and still has a symbolic type at the end 
of its analysis, we will generate the appropriate assertion.  
Assertions for pointer variable and function pointer 
evaluations are also generated by Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 2 shows assertions generated due to 
compound member selection. This is only called for union 
members (not structures, as they have concrete types). In 
short, for unions an assertion is generated not only for whole 
union assignment involving symbolic types but also for 
usage member selection.   
 
1  #include <stdio.h> 
2  typedef struct { 
3       int a; 
4       struct { 
5           char b; 
6           void *c; 
7           union { 
8               int a; 
9               union { 
10                  int a; 
11                  double c; 
12              } b; 
13          } d; 
14          void *m; 
15      } s; 
16      void *j; 
17  } deep; 
18 
19  int something_else (deep u, deep t) 
20  {  
21       u.a = 5; 
22       t.a = 5.6; 
23       t.s.d.b = u.s.d.b; 
24  } 
 
Figure 8. An example of unions deeply embedded inside 
structures 
Input: Target symbol, T and Source symbol, S  
Output:  True if T and S are compatible, False if not;  
               An assertion is generated if S or T is still symbolic.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
if T is a polymorphic variable then 
     if T‘s type is symbolic then  
          Generate an assertion that T’s type is equal to S’s type  
          Update T‘s type with S‘s type (either concrete or symbolic)  
           return true 
     else if S‗s type is symbolic then  
           Generate an assertion that S’s type is equal to T’s type 
           Update S‘s type with T‘s concrete type  
           return true  
     endif  
else if S‘s type is symbolic then  
     Generate an assertion that S is equal to T’s concrete type  
     Update S’s type with T‘s concrete type  
      return true 
endif  
return basetype of T == basetype of S 
 
Algorithm 1. Assertion Generation in the Type Compatibility 
Checking Module  
Identifier Type Member Id 
u.a int  a 
u.s.b char  b 
u.s.c @u.s.c        
u.s.d @u.s.d             
u.s.d.b @u.s.d.b           
u.s.m @u.s.m       
u.j @u.j  
t.a int a 
t.s.b char b 
t.s.c @t.s.c       
t.s.d @t.s.d  
t.s.d.b @t.s.d.b  
t.s.m @t.s.m  
t.j @t.j  
…  …        
 
Figure 9. Initial state of the table after the declaration of 
variables u and t in Figure 8 
 
 
D. Implementation Status  
About 1100 lines of codes have been added to the 
original sparse type evaluator. Our assertion library 
(libassert.h) provides all necessary data structures and 
functions to dynamically update and check the latest type 
information.  These functions include runtime opening and 
closing of the function stacks, updating the types, lookup and 
mechanisms to inform the called function about any 
polymorphic parameter-argument relationships, if there is 
any.  
The placement and shape of the inform parameter-
argument relationship function is currently being optimized 
to support more complex expressions. We will put these 
functions within the scope of if/while statements, instead of 
outside. Currently, we implement the library using simple 
string comparisons to demonstrate proof-of-concept. We are 
converting it to offset based comparisons.  
IV. CASE STUDY 
We return to the motivational example given in Figure 3.  
Using the approach we have described above, the static 
analyser will recognize that the union type buffer, buf is not 
yet defined in the context of the hfs_bnode_read() 
function.  Therefore, buf will have a symbolic type in this 
context.  Furthermore, knowing that memcpy() is 
effectively an assignment operation, the analyser can 
determine if assertions are needed for a secure memcpy() 
operation.  In this case, a type assertion should be inserted 
right before the memcpy() at line 14, as shown in 
Figure 10.  As explained in Section 2, function 
type_is(x,y) checks whether the current type of x is 
compatible with y‘s type.  Notice that a temporary variable, 
‗_temp1‘ must be generated to ensure that only a single call 
is made to the kmap() function, which could return 
different values if called more than once. 
The static analyser could also perform symbolic 
execution to determine the buffer length of both the memory 
range in the destination and the source of the call to 
memcpy().  As both lengths are unknown (i.e., they are 
symbolic lengths), a runtime assertion can be inserted before 
memcpy(), as shown in line 13 of Figure 10. Function 
buflen_gt() will return false if the buffer length of the 
source is greater than that of the destination. (Generating 
bounds checks such as that shown in line 13 is straight 
forward [10] and is not done by our current prototype which 
focuses on type correctness.) 
V. RELATED WORK 
To make C safer, new languages have been developed 
with changes in syntax by putting new restrictions on 
standard C, and by adding more annotations.  The Cyclone 
language [11], a dialect of C, provides mechanisms such as 
sum types and subtyping within C, allowing safer programs 
to be written.  Cyclone extends the union type by adding a 
tag to each case of the union.  Arguments with unions in 
Cyclone are treated as tagged-unions.  One of our advantages 
over Cyclone is that we do not modify existing data 
structures, i.e., we are fully backward-compatible and 
interoperable.  Functional languages like Haskell and ML 
provide disjoint sum types within the language, enabling 
precise typing of compound objects [12].  These new 
languages are safer but require programs to be redesigned.  
This is not always possible as developers may need the 
flexibility of memory access in standard C to achieve 
performance and compactness.  Furthermore, the conversion 
has to be done manually, and there is no guarantee that the 
new dialect does not introduce new problems.  We instead 
focus on making legacy code written in C safer. 
There has been much recent work on statically proving 
memory safety of C programs to make them execute 
safely [6],[1].  However, the latest commercial analysers like 
the Coverity Dynamic Analyser only analyse Java 
multithreading programs, disregarding legacy code written in 
C.  Another major player, Klocwork, focuses purely on static 
analysis techniques. 
As certain evaluations are not statically possible, some 
analysers add runtime checks.  For example, CCured adds 
runtime checks for certain premisses in its pointer-kind type 
inference rules [1].  But, for unions, CCured either adds 
additional tags or removes unions altogether in the program 
and replaces them with structures.  Both approaches modify 
the union structures and may not work for hardware-
dependent applications where the data layout cannot be 
Input:  A union with a selected member 
Output:  if legitimate then return the selected member  
 else return error 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
if member selection occurs as a definition then 
     Update the parent‘s entry in the symbol table with this member 
else /* member selection occur as a usage */ 
     Lookup the parent‘s current member selection in the symbol    
     table 
     if lookup returns a symbolic type then 
          Generate an assertion that the parent‘s type is equal to this  
          member‘s type 
          Update the parent‘s entry in the symbol table 
     else if lookup result is NOT equal to the selected member then 
           return error 
     endif 
endif 
return this member 
 




1  void hfs_bnode_read (struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf,  
     int off, int len) 
2  { 
3        open_st("hfs_bnode_read"); 
4 add_polyvar("buf"); 
5 relate(); 
6 struct page *page; 
7 
8        off += node->page_offset; 
9       page = node->page[0]; 
10 
11 _temp1 = kmap(page) + off; 
12 assert(type_is(buf, _temp1));  
13 assert(buflen_gt(buf, _temp1, len)); 
14 memcpy(buf, _temp1, len); 




Figure 10. Program in Figure 3 instrumented with appropriate 
runtime assertions 
 
changed.  Runtime type information has been used for bug 
finding and providing debugging information for bad casting 
or union access [6], but these assertions are manually formed 
and inserted into the source. Avots et al. [13] use dynamic 
type checking but because the type of a global or 
dynamically allocated object is taken to be the type of its 
first dereference, they produce false positive type violations, 
which they must remove manually. Instead, we rely 
exclusively on source code to identify, form and insert the 
runtime assertions, relieving the burden from developers of 
doing these jobs manually.  Unlike Yong and Horwitz [14], 
we instrument both reads and writes. 
Jones and Kelly presented a backward compatible bound 
checking method and implemented it in gcc [10].  In their 
implementation, all known valid storage objects are 
maintained in a table, and one can use the table to map a 
pointer to a descriptor of the object into which it points, 
which contains the base, extent and additional information to 
improve error reporting.  They did not, however, support 
tracking of types in unions.   
Xu et al. [15] presented a transformation of C programs 
to a ―safer C‖ but it may not always be practical for existing 
applications. They use metadata to track information about 
pointers and unions but focus more on correctness than 
vulnerabilities.  They use a runtime mark for unions which is 
nearly identical to ours, but they do so only because they 
need it in case the union contains a pointer type. They do not 
use symbolic evaluation; instead, they generate assertions for 
every reference.  They mention static analysis only as a 
possible optimization technique in the ―Global 
Optimizations‖ section, but, while they consider it very 
promising, it is intended for future work.  Similarly, Dhurjati 
and Adve [16] modify function interfaces and function calls 
to add metadata. They claim to have low overhead compared 
to other approaches primarily due to the use of Automatic 
Pool Allocation for memory allocation.  However, this 
changes the underlying architecture significantly. There is no 
mention of how they treat unions. 
Finally, Rosenblum and Clark [5][17] empirically 
identified categories of assertions that can be written into C 
programs to discover faults, but not vulnerabilities.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We have explained our approach for analysing C source 
code programs involving unions and pointer variables that 
may lead to security vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows.  
We use static analysis to resolve variable types where 
possible, but generate runtime assertions when static 
checking is insufficient.   
At the time of writing we have completed a prototype 
implementation of our approach which performs the 
necessary static analysis and identifies points in the program 
where assertions are needed.  Using information gained from 
the static analysis, it forms and generates the assertions into a 
―diff‖ file which can be used to produce the secure, 
instrumented program. In future, we will add more elaborate 
assertions to handle various forms of C constructs, such as 
buffer length assertions, loop assertions, interfile assertions, 
pointer assertions, etc. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We wish to thank the anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments.  This work was supported in part by the 
Defence Signals Directorate via ARC Linkage Grant 
LP0776344. 
REFERENCES 
[1] G. C. Necula, J. Condit, M. Harren, S. McPeak and W. Weimer, 
―CCured: Type-Safe Retrofitting of Legacy Software,‖ ACM Trans. 
Program. Lang. Syst., vol. 27, 2005, pp. 477–526. 
[2] D. Wagner, J. Foster, E. Brewer and A. Aiken, ―A First Step Toward 
Automated Detection of Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities,‖ 
Proceedings of the Network Distributed Systems Security 
Symposium, 2000,  pp. 1–15. 
[3] C.A.R. Hoare, ―Assertions: A Personal Perspective,‖ IEEE Annals of 
the History of Computing, vol. 25, 2003, pp. 14–25. 
[4] P. Chalin, Ensuring Continued Mainstream Use of Formal Methods: 
An Assessment, Roadmap and Issues. Concordia University, 2005. 
[5] D.S. Rosenblum, ―A Practical Approach to Programming with 
Assertions,‖  IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 21, 
1995, pp. 19–31. 
[6] A. Loginov, S. Yong, S. Horwitz and T. Reps, ―Debugging via 
Runtime Type Checking,‖ Proceedings FASE‘01,  LNCS, vol. 2029, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2001,  pp. 217–232. 
[7] B. Liblit, A. Aiken, A. Zheng and M. Jordan, ―Bug Isolation via 
Remote Program Sampling,‖ Proceedings PLDI‘03, 2003, pp. 141-
154. 
[8] Y. Cheon, ―A Runtime Assertion Checker for the Java Modeling 
Language,‖ Technical Report, TR#03-09, Iowa State University, 
2003. 
[9] Sparse, http://sparse.wiki.kernel.org, 2010. 
[10] R.W.M. Jones and P.H.J. Kelly, ―Backwards-Compatible Bounds 
Checking for Arrays and Pointers in C Programs,‖ Proceedings of 
Third International Workshop on Automated Debugging, 1997, pp. 
13–26. 
[11] T. Jim, G. Morrisett, D. Grossman, M. Hicks, J. Cheney and Y. 
Wang, ―Cyclone: A Safe Dialect of C,‖ Proceedings of the USENIX 
Annual Technical Conference, Monterey, 2002. 
[12] M. Furr and J. Foster, ―Checking Type Safety of Foreign Function 
Calls,‖ Proceedings PLDI‘05, New York: ACM Press, 2005,  pp. 62–
72. 
[13] D. Avots, M. Dalton, V. B. Livshits and M.S. Lam, ―Improving 
software security with a C pointer analysis.‖ Proceedings ICSE '05, 
New York: ACM Press, 2005, pp. 332-341. 
[14] S. H. Yong and S. Horwitz, ―Protecting c programs from attacks via 
invalid pointer dereferences.‖ Foundations of Software Engineering, 
2003. 
[15] W. Xu, D. C. DuVarney, and R. Sekar, ―An efficient and backwards-
compatible transformation to ensure memory safety of C programs.‖ 
Proc. 12th ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Foundations of Software 
Engineering, 2004, pp. 117–126. 
[16] D. Dhurjati and V. Adve, ―Backwards-compatible array bounds 
checking for C with very low overhead.‖ Proceeding of the 28th 
international conference on Software engineering, Shanghai, China, 
2006, pp. 162-171. 
[17] L.A. Clarke and D.S. Rosenblum, ―A Historical Perspective on 
Runtime Assertion Checking in Software Development,‖ ACM 
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, vol. 31, 2006, pp. 25–37. 
 
 
